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Abstract: Most interpreters of Heidegger’s reflections on the body maintain that—
whether early, middle, or late in the Gesamtausgabe—Dasein’s or the mortal’s openness 
to being/beyng is the ground of the fleshly or bodily (das Leibliche), but not the 
reverse. In this paper, I argue that there is evidence from Heidegger’s own oeuvre 
demonstrating that this relationship is instead mutually reciprocal. That is to say, I 
contend that corporeal variability is constitutive of Dasein’s openness to being just as 
Dasein’s openness to being is constitutive of its corporeal variability. Understood in 
this way, Heidegger’s thinking puts forward what I call a corpoietic understanding of 
the body and of the meaning of ability. I show that, despite the ableist assumptions at 
play in much of Heidegger’s work, such an understanding is nevertheless grounded in 
the idea of access, a central concept in philosophy of disability and disability studies. 
After developing this idea of ability as access, I close by addressing the larger political 
stakes of using Heidegger’s work to think about embodiment and disability given the 
Third Reich’s mass slaughter of people with disabilities.
“Heidegger tries to make the word Dasein (‘existence’) say: Dasein 
is being the there (da) [la là]. With the body, it’s only a question of 
this: how is it that I am the there . . . . when a baby is born, there’s 
a new ‘there’ . . . the body is the unity of a being outside itself [le 
corps est l’unité d’un être hors de soi].” 
—Nancy, Corpus1
As for the exposure and rearing of children [ἀποθέσεως καὶ 
τροφῆς τῶν γιγνομένων], let there be a law that no deformed 
[πεπηρωμένον] child shall live. 
—Aristotle, Politics2
Heidegger (in)famously says little about the body.3 He even claims that “the bodily is the most difficult [problem] (das Leibliche das Schwierigste ist)” 
(GA 89: 231/292).4 One explanation is that Heidegger understood the dyad 
Leib-Körper and its relationship to Seele-Geist to be nearly beyond recuperation 
from a metaphysics of presence that paradigmatically divides matter from spirit, 
σῶμα from ψυχή. But in his later years, Heidegger developed a host of concepts 
and ways of speaking that he thought better approached a thinking of things 
outside of the metaphysics of presence. As he commented in a letter to Dieter 
Sinn, the language of the 1954 Bremen Lectures marked the first time he had 
published his thinking “on its own terms.”5 Why, one must ask, did a rethink-
ing of the body not appear there? Or did it? Or, most provocatively of all, had 
it been there all along?
While one would be hard-pressed to disagree that Heidegger—early, middle, 
and late—explicitly argues that Dasein’s or the mortal’s openness to being/
beyng is the ground of the fleshly or bodily (das Leibliche) and not the reverse, 
I will argue that there is evidence from Heidegger’s own oeuvre demonstrating 
that this relationship is instead mutually reciprocal. That is to say, corporeal 
variability is constitutive of Dasein’s openness to being just as Dasein’s open-
ness is constitutive of its “corporeal variability.” By drawing upon resources in 
philosophy of disability and disability studies, my aim is to explore this line of 
interpretation in the hope of charting a new path for conceptualizing embodi-
ment in and through Heidegger’s thought, especially, though by no means only, 
in relationship to disability.
I defend this claim neither by focusing on Heidegger’s explicit reflections on 
the body, nor on his methodological concerns over the body as a problematic, the 
scholarship concerning both of which has already been well-established. I instead 
focus upon how the body shows (or does not show) itself through Heidegger’s 
analyses of mortality and the mortal. I further claim that this interpretative 
focus provides a new understanding of the body and of the meaning of ability 
in Heidegger, which I refer to as corpoietic. I contend that this understanding 
is in fact defined by a central concept in philosophy of disability and disability 
studies: access. It is in both of these ways that I take a different path than past 
commenters on Heidegger and embodiment.
In section one, using the discussion of Sein-zum-Tode in §§51–53 of Being 
and Time and the role of die Sterblichen in the Bremen Lectures as my primary 
evidence, I contend that Heidegger’s own accounts of the role of mortality in 
thinking die Seinsfrage demonstrate corporeal variability as constitutive of 
Dasein’s openness to being. In short, such variability plays an equiprimordial 
role with mortality and natality. Through a discussion of Heidegger’s neologism 
leiben (typically rendered ‘bodying’ or ‘bodying-forth’), I then suggest in section 
two that Heidegger’s thinking proffers what I call a corpoietic understanding 
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of the body. In section three, I show that such an understanding of the body is 
grounded in the idea of access. In closing, I address the larger political stakes 
of using Heidegger’s work to think about embodiment and disability given the 
Third Reich’s targeted mass slaughter of people with disabilities.
1. The Bodiliness of Dasein: Natality-Mortality-Variability
Kevin Aho contends—along with most commentators—that criticisms of Hei-
degger’s neglect of the body misunderstand the fact that his analyses are “prior 
to the emergence of the human body and its various capacities.”6 Such criticisms, 
in other words, misunderstand the fact that Heidegger does not engage the 
body because the body is not part of his project that inquires into fundamental 
ontology and is not so for defensible and explicit reasons. The “material” and 
“corruptible” body does not disclose the being of the being for whom being is 
a question, much less the dispensation or sending of beyng to and for which 
the mortal is called. On the contrary, it obfuscates that being. Put simply, the 
body, scholars such as Kevin Aho and Christian Ciocan claim, is not irrelevant 
to philosophy in general, but it is irrelevant to fundamental ontology and/or—
depending upon how diachronically one reads such claims across Heidegger’s 
oeuvre—to a thinking of being through things and the Fourfold (das Geviert).7 
But does the Heideggerian corpus in fact support this claim, however one inter-
prets Heidegger’s explicit reflections on embodiment?
Near the outset of the second division of Sein und Zeit, Heidegger argues 
against understanding death in terms of the death of the body. “The no-longer-
being-in the-world of the deceased (understood in an extreme sense) is still a 
being [ein Sein] in the sense of the mere objective presence [Nur-noch-vorhan-
densein] of a corporeal thing encountered” (GA 2: 238/229).8 While Dasein 
cannot experience this loss, in death it “loses the being of the there” (237/229). 
Heidegger then defines, recasting Epicurus, this being-towards-death as a pos-
sibility whose actualization cannot, in principle, occur. That is to say, there is 
a not-yet (noch-nicht) that is definitive of Dasein’s character. In being towards 
death, Dasein is constitutively in relation to death.9
Heidegger further explains, “the problem is not a matter of our grasp of the 
not-yet of the character of Dasein, but rather the possible being or nonbeing of this 
not-yet. Dasein, as itself, has to become, that is, be, what it is not yet” (243/234). 
It is a being “to whose kind of being becoming [Werden] belongs” (ibid). But as 
Jacques Derrida and Reiner Schürmann, among others, argue, both following 
Hannah Arendt, this is only half of the story. The singularization effected by 
mortality cannot be thought outside of the simultaneity of the singularization of 
natality.10 To put it bluntly, as David Farrell Krell recently does, “a fundamental 
ontology of Dasein cannot ignore [birth].”11 Heidegger himself notes this is-
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sue in §72 of Sein und Zeit, only to argue, unconvincingly, I think, against the 
claim that natality is given as a foundation by the Zeitlichkeit of Dasein (GA 2: 
355–60/372–77). Whether one agrees with Arendt’s specific casting of natality 
as a question of innovation and creativity, it is the pair natality-mortality that 
explains the interconnection of life with death—life as a form of dying and dying 
as a form of life—that Heidegger himself otherwise acknowledges (248–49/239, 
fn. 6). Being-towards-death is only conceivable as one side of a Janus-head whose 
other side reads becoming-life.
Of course, being born (becoming a being that can become) cannot be ex-
plained merely as “entering” into a body.12 Neither natality, nor mortality can 
be reduced to the body (even if heard in terms of das Leib, the lived body) and 
neither are, of course, experienced as such. As Irigaray explains the former, “there 
was a kind of subsistence already, prior to the constitution of Being-in-the-world 
. . . the subsistence of a living body that draws its life from fluid matter.”13 Natality 
and mortality are two opposing poles, the pulls of which constantly and uniquely 
singularize Dasein. But there is a third singularization. This singularization acts 
upon the divergent, oppositionally taut structure of natality and mortality, and 
Heidegger failed to see it, arguably, due to his hesitance to engage das Leibproblem 
head on. The third singularization along with natality and morality is corporeal 
variability. Let me explain what I mean by this term and why it plays this role.
At any given moment the relation of Dasein to the opposing poles of na-
tality or mortality can shift. For example, after learning of her diagnosis of 
Lymphangioleiomyomatosis, Havi Carel writes, “I had to overhaul all my plans, 
expectations, goals, projects and horizons. Most importantly, I had to rethink 
my idea of a good life.”14 How could the state of one’s body fundamentally change 
one’s idea of a good life, goodness itself, and even life itself—change the very 
meaningfulness of one’s world? Carel is not claiming that this or that fact of her 
life changed. She is claiming that her total understanding of things, her “world” 
in the language of Being and Time, fundamentally changed.15 This is only possible 
if there is a structural variability constitutive of the being of Da-sein. Only if in 
addition to mortality and natality, there is a variability that harbors the possibility 
to transform one’s relation to each and to their interrelation. The body calls into 
question and transforms Dasein’s relation to natality and mortality and, thereby, 
to the disclosivity of Dasein—to the mortal as a clearing for being.16
Take the following examples. In phenomena ranging from injury to illness, 
from daily fluctuations in fatigue or mood to aging—and across the alterations in 
attunement coextensive with these—the singularization of the opposing pulls of 
natality and mortality become salient.17 In the euphoria during and after exercise 
to the euphoria during and after sex, from the use of certain psychoactive and 
psychotropic substances to the feeling of “getting something” intellectually—and 
through the shifts in attunement coextensive with these—the singularization 
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effected through the tension between natality and morality becomes salient. 
The saliences in question are a function of how the bodily, das Leibliche, gath-
ers and is gathered through the singularizations such variability realizes. These 
examples each demonstrate that the constant singularization effected through 
natality-mortality (what we ordinarily, and even some of the existentialists, call 
human “life”) is constitutively variable. One’s relationship towards existence, 
towards one’s unchosen beginning and inevitable end, is ever refracted through 
the variations and variabilities of one’s embodiment. Corporeal variability shapes 
the meaning of natality and mortality for any given Dasein. So far from being 
some material thing, whether lived, ready-to-hand, present-to-hand, or what have 
you, the body just is the pro-ject of navigating between natality and morality.
Heidegger comments that “we must disentangle the structural variations pos-
sible for them [what is outstanding, end, and wholeness] in different realms, that 
is, deformalized variations which are related to beings with a defined content and 
which are structurally determined in terms of their being [Sein]” (241/232). That 
one would, in the methodological context of Being and Time, ignore structural 
variations that are genuinely ontic, existentielle matters strikes me as defensible. 
But the variability of the structure natality-morality is itself a constitutive and 
determinate factor, a corporeal variability which Heidegger fails to see in its ac-
tual existential role. In other words, Heidegger’s fundamental ontology, at least 
during the time period surrounding Sein und Zeit, fails to think through the 
structural bodily or corporeal variability of Dasein. In light of the claims being 
made here, the question remains how to hear the terms “body” and “corporeal” 
in this context, viz., as a structure of variability that modulates the relationship 
between natality and mortality. That is to say, the question remains how to hear 
it in a manner that mitigates its historical entrenchment in a metaphysics of pres-
ence and in no way thinks the body in terms of a material-immaterial binary.18 
Before I address this explicitly, I will first turn to argue that the role of corporeal 
variability appears also in the Bremen Lectures, especially in Heidegger’s discus-
sion of die Sterblichen.
2. The Bodiliness of the Mortal: Corpoietics
In the 1954 Bremen Lectures, Heidegger writes, “When we say: mortals, then we 
already think, in case we are thinking, the other three along with them from the 
single fold of the four” (GA 79: 18/17). To think the mortal is to think interrela-
tion. It is, in this sense, a differential thinking—a thinking that takes variation 
between and of things as definitive of their being.19 Each of the four, in their own 
way, make present the being of beings. The thing things, to use the language 
of that lecture, only insofar as it is constituted through and singularized in the 
fourfold. The singularity of the mortal—its specific fold, as it were—is central 
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to the way in which the thing worlds, the way in which it can be met. But what 
is the primary determinate difference between each of the folds of the fourfold: 
earth, sky, gods, and mortals? It is the way in which they are singularized.
And what defines the singularity of the mortal for Heidegger? “The mortals 
are the humans. They are called the mortals because they are able to die (sie 
sterben können)” (GA 79: 17/17). To the mortal belongs the ability (das Können), 
the capability (das Vermögen) to die a death as a death.20 The singularization of 
the mortal as a fold of the fourfold is in its ability to radically vary its relation 
to being—through death as death, an ultimate variation of its relation to being. 
This is a variability the earth, sky, and gods presumably do not share. It is, to 
incorporate the discussion from above, the mortal’s variable relation to natality 
and mortality that defines the mortal. But what does it mean to be able to die qua 
death? It means to be the sort of being whose bodily existence shifts between the 
poles of natality and morality, between an unchosen, non-experienceable point 
of entry into existence and a typically unchosen, non-experienceable point of 
future non-existence. Corporeal variability is constitutive of die Sterblichen. In 
other words, the “capability to die a death as a death” only has meaning insofar 
as it assumes corporeal variability as a third existential (to use the language of 
Sein und Zeit) or essential belonging (to use the language of the later works) 
alongside natality and mortality. Whether one looks to 1927 or to 1949 onward, 
the structures of natality, mortality, and corporeal variability appear determinate 
to understand beings for whom being is a question. However, the question still 
remains how to more precisely hear the “corporeal” in “corporeal variability.”
2.1 Corpoietic Bodying
On the May 11th meeting detailed in the Zollikon Seminars, Heidegger approaches 
the question of the bodily through the body’s relation to the here. While one is 
always one’s here, the body is not “here” or present in the same way as any other 
object. The body makes present.21 The specific leibhaft of Dasein is then explored 
through phenomena such as blushing, crying, pain, and sadness. Heidegger works 
his way to the insight that the way in which the body is, the manner of the body, 
is through a gathering—a gathering that makes present. The “here” that I am, 
while always gathering and making present, is nevertheless always differentially 
determined. Heidegger writes,
“I am here at all times” means that I always abide in a ‘here.’ However, in 
each case, the ‘here’ is this one. I am always at some particular ‘here,’ but 
I am not always at this specific place [Ort]. In each case the body always 
participates [beteiligt] in the being-here . . . The bodying forth of the body 
is determined by the way of my being [Das Leiben des Leibes bestimmt sich 
aus der Weise meines Seins]. The bodying forth of the body, therefore, is a 
way of Da-seins’s being [eine Weise des Da-seins]. But what kind of being? 
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If the body as body is always my body, then this is my own way of being. 
Thus, bodying forth is co-determined by my being human in the sense of 
the ecstatic sojourn [ekstatischen Aufenthaltes] amidst the beings in the 
clearing. The limit of bodying forth (the body is only as it bodies forth: lived 
body) is the horizon of being within which I abide. Therefore, the limit of 
my bodying forth changes constantly through the transformation in the reach 
of my abiding [Deshalb wandelt sich die Grenze des Leibens ständig durch die 
Wandlung der Reichweite meines Aufenthaltes] (GA 89: 85–87/112–13, my 
italics, translation modified).22
Here one finds the most explicit textual support for what I’m calling “corporeal 
variability.” But it should now be clear that while “bodying forth is co-determined 
by my being human,” the converse is also true: being human is co-determined by 
my bodying forth.23 The way in which Da-sein is (in the sense of west) is always 
already shaped through not simply its bodying forth through the body of one’s 
mother and the bodies of caretakers and all those around one; it is also always 
already shaped through the variability of one’s singular body. The variation of a 
given bodying-forth, a bodying-forth that is in each case mine, equiprimordially 
determines the singularizations of natality and mortality, of the bodying forth 
that always already has been given through the life-giver and the bodying forth 
that always already is coming through death.
This is a conception of the body, then, that is neither σῶμα (soma), corpus, 
Leib, Körper, chair, corps, flesh, body, nor corpse, but δέμας (demas): that figu-
ration which forms and fashions the being of a being. In a passage from book 
XI of Homer’s Iliad describing Euryplos and Aias’s rallying their companions, 
they are described as fighting on in “the figure of a blazing fire” (δέμας πυρὸς 
αἰθομένοιο).24 The labors of these fighting bodies is self-shown in a figuration 
of flames—the flames gather and bind the meaning, the sense, of these bodies 
through a demas, a likeness or form. In Lattimore’s translation, he variously 
renders δέμας as stature, form, and likeness. The δέμας of a being captures its 
essential presencing, the way a being bodies forth in its particular density.25 
Δέμας, as I’m reading it, names the generative gathering and always emergent 
constitution of a being as the being it is in this particular situation—its, in a 
word, figuration.26 The binding of δέμας is in each case a figuration of the sin-
gularizations of natality, mortality, and corporeal variation. Because the phrase 
“dematic bodying” or variations on it are grating, I will call this understanding 
of the body corpoietic. A corpoietic understanding of the body or bodiliness, 
one which I find the analyses above to evince, understands that term as picking 
out the figuration of our being through the triune relationship between natal-
ity, mortality, and corporeal variability. To be a corpoietic being means to be 
structured by each of these, a structure which is always already poietic, wherein 
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poiesis is heard as becoming, generation, creation, emergence, and making.27 A 
making that is always, in principle, anew because always, in principle, variable.28
A corpoietic thinking accounts for the singularizing poles of mortality and 
natality as well as the constitutive variability of Dasein’s openness. That is to say, 
it accounts for the roles of corruptibility, growth, homeostasis, and ontogenesis 
in the emergence and maintenance of sense without reducing a “body” to the 
material or making it secondary or derivative. It also accounts for the binding 
of the body—the way in which I do not have a body, but am in each case my 
bodying-forth. If my account is right, then Heidegger’s ouevre did not neglect 
the body as much as it failed to thematize a structure at work in and continually 
developed through his thinking. A corpoietic thinking thinks the singularity of a 
gathering that discloses. And that thinking, I’d proffer, is precisely one μέθοδος, 
one way into, die Seinsfrage.
3. Corpoietics, Disability, and Access
I’ve argued that Heidegger can be read as offering a corpoietic account of the body, 
one in which the corporeal figuration of Dasein is determinate for its experience 
of the tension between the existential poles of natality and morality. I will now 
suggest that philosophy of disability and disability studies offers a promising 
hermeneutic route to better understand and appreciate the meaning of such 
an account through the concept of access. In short, although Heidegger doesn’t 
make “accessibility” a leitmotif, a disability lens on his work suggests that the 
concept of access plays a larger role than one might otherwise assume. To make 
this argument, I will look to the opening section of Heidegger’s first speaking 
engagement after the war, “The Thing” (Das Ding).29 At the outset, Heidegger 
focuses on a pitcher in a way that seems similar to his focus on the hammer in 
the Werkstatt of Sein und Zeit: he questions how one establishes the being of the 
being—or, now, thing—in question.
Heidegger begins by focusing on how a pitcher (a handheld container hold-
ing liquid) “stands on its own,” how it is selbstständig. At first blush, the pitcher 
appears autonomous or independent. As self-standing (Selbstand), Heidegger 
argues the pitcher cannot be an object (Gegenstand). Its being or thinghood does 
not lie in being an object for us or, correlatively, being an object for itself and thus 
a question of pure “objectivity”. Representational options—whether objectivist 
or subjectivist—set aside, Heidegger then pivots to the pitcher’s production. It 
has come to stand on its own through a producing. This route too is misguided, 
he contends, for it assumes that by thinking the pitcher in its becoming, one 
avoids objectifying it. To the contrary, Heidegger claims that explanations of the 
pitcher focused on production are simply a different form of representational 
objectification.
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These errors are not caused by the application of some mode of objectifying 
thinking to a given thing. Heidegger clarifies: “standing-on-its-own (Insichstehen) 
is therefore still thought, and despite everything is ever still thought, in terms of 
an objectivity (und ist trotz allem immer noch von der Gegenstaendlichkeit her 
gedacht) (GA 79: 6/6). The trotz allem immer noch does not here indicate that 
the standing-on-its-own of the pitcher could be thought outside of objectivity. 
Instead, he suggests that the thinking of a thing in terms of autonomy and inde-
pendence is a fundamental failure of thinking a thing.
The reasons for this failure become clearer when Heidegger offers his first 
positive definition of the pitcher: “the thinghood of the pitcher lies in that it is 
as a vessel” (Das Dinghafte des Kruges beruht darin, daß er als Gefäß ist) (GA 79: 
7/7). And by virtue of what does the pitcher as vessel thing? It things as nothing. 
He continues, “the empty is what holds in the vessel. The empty, this nothing in 
the pitcher, is what the pitcher is as a holding vessel.” But Heidegger is careful 
not to claim that the pitcher is this empty (Leere) or this nothing (Nichts). The 
sides and base and the potter’s formation are determined by the nothing, but 
their support is still necessary and co-constitutive. It is through their support 
that the pitcher is as a holding vessel. The pitcher is only as a holding vessel, a 
holding which holds through a nothing, a nothing that has determined the sides 
and base in the shaping hands of the potter and, in turn, a nothing which is sup-
ported through its determination and constitution by sides and base, potter and 
earth, pourer and imbiber, folds of the fourfold.
Heidegger leads his reader to see that so far from being self-standing, 
autonomous, or able to be a pitcher on its own, the pitcher only “is” through 
simultaneously constant and historical supports, though mediums of support, 
to evoke one of Andrew Mitchell’s primary explanatory terms in The Fourfold: 
Reading the Late Heidegger.30 The things things, yes, but it things as the world 
worlds—namely, in and as a fold of the fourfold. In thinking the singularity of the 
thing, we think the whole in and through which it is singularized. As Heidegger 
puts it, “the thing things the world . . . thinking in this way we are met by the thing 
as thing. We are, in the strict sense of the word, conditioned [Be-Dingten]. We 
have left the arrogance of everything unconditional behind us” (GA 79: 19/20). 
The ability of the thing to be what it is is through its mediational, conditioned 
supports. Heidegger’s thinking of the pitcher is a thinking of ability as media-
tional support. I, for reasons that will soon become clear, call this ability as access.
My argument for this reading comprises two primary claims, claims which 
together articulate what I am calling a thinking of ability as access.
{1} Heidegger’s thinking of ability as mediational support provides normative 
content insofar as it, upon the advent of commemorative thinking, prescribes 
conditions for the support of a being to be, which is to say, the support a being 
needs to be able to be as it is or essences (in the sense of the Heidegger’s west).
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{2} Ability expectations, which are necessarily constituted in part by ontic 
conditions, frame ontological projection or, in his later language, the com-
memorative possibilities of the thinker.31
As regards claim {1}, in giving an account of what it is for a given thing to be 
as it is, this presumably descriptive procedure is prescriptive precisely insofar as 
the “as it is” is operative. However implicitly, commemorative thinking, in draw-
ing near to things, prescribes the conditions for the nearness in which a thing 
can appear as it is, even if only by negation (one cannot draw near to a thing 
through mere representational thinking, etc.). To put it simply, to make a claim 
about what a thing is as it shows itself to be cannot but be normative; there is no 
originary or “true” showing without an injunction about how something ought to 
be understood or experienced, including how one ought to come to experience it.
As an example, the pitcher needs not only sides and base, pourer and imbiber, 
but also needs its pourer, at minimum, to have opposable thumbs. The thing-
hood of the pitcher is different for some humans born with atypical limbs. It 
should be clear that Heidegger’s definition of the pitcher is not merely descriptive 
and prescriptive with respect to the pitcher, but also to the thing for which the 
pitcher can be as it is, viz., the mortal—bracketing the role of the sky and gods 
for the discussion at hand. At least with respect to the example I just gave, such 
a definition is decidedly ableist. Based on the definition Heidegger provides, it 
affords those with a standard body the privilege of the potential to access the 
pitcher as the thing it is. One threshold to draw near to the pitcher, at least as 
Heidegger describes it, is that of the standard body—but, of course, one could 
give a different account of the pitcher that avoids that ableist error.
As regards claim {2}, although Heidegger later eschews much of the terminol-
ogy of hermeneutical phenomenology, he still gives a role to the way in which the 
human comes to and is taken by phenomena, viz., as a mortal. The mortal—as 
mortal—is of course constituted in part by its mortality. That is to say, the fact 
of mortality shapes both that and how the mortal encounters other beings or 
things. As I would phrase it, the ability expectations of the mortal determine the 
way in which a thing things. This means that the fundamental ontology of the 
phenomenologist or the commemorative thinking of the mortal are shaped by 
the access their abilities afford and considerations of the way that abilities afford 
access are requisite for phenomenological inquiry.32 It is no wonder then that 
Heidegger’s account of the pitcher is ableist. Because Heidegger does not turn 
his attention to the access afforded by his abilities and ability expectations, the 
account of the pitcher reflects his access. He does not question the meaning or 
thinghood of the pitcher with respect to one who is blind, to one without arms, 
to one with ADHD, to one with cerebral palsy attendant with epilepsy, or to one 
recovering from alcoholism. Although Heidegger does not explicitly attend to 
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these questions and to, more broadly, his own embodiment, I am arguing that 
he nevertheless provides us a way of thinking about ability as access.
The hermeneutic path laid out up to this point runs as follows: if one is 
claimed by the question of the meaning of being, one ought to inquire into the 
meaning of being, an inquiry which cannot but open onto the meaning of ability 
as access, which, further, cannot but open onto reflection upon the abilities and 
ability expectations of the thinker, etc. This questioning will certainly produce 
not just descriptions, but also prescriptions (e.g., don’t treat beings merely as 
resources), even if they are in principle defeasible thanks to their grounding in 
a fundamentally interrogative comportment. I’ve called this way of questioning, 
of thinking, “ability as access.” Let me retrace the steps taken so far. The think-
ing of the thing as thing is a thinking of the abilities of that thing through its 
mediational supports and the access to being necessary for it to be. In the case 
of the pitcher, Heidegger argued its primary “ability” is as a nothing that holds. 
The pitcher has access to the ability to be as it is when supported in claiming 
other beings by and through its being in relation to its world. Its ability to make 
a claim on mortals requires a host of supports, including everything from non-
alcoholism to opposable thumbs to a sufficient supply of oxygen, etc. Whether 
or not the pitcher has access to these avenues or ways is a question of the abode 
and comportment in and through which it appears as a thing in relationship to 
other things/beings that take it to be as such. Its abilities articulate avenues and 
axes of access. The ability to be is a question of access. Access to what? Not just 
to being (however we hear that given various ways to focus upon Heidegger’s 
corpus: as Sein, Ereignis, or Lichtung, etc.), but also to beings or things of all sorts. 
Access, in turn, is always already a question of ethics (in the sense of ἦθος), for 
the ability to be is a question of the access to be so. Thinking ability as access is 
a thinking of the meaning of being. The question of the meaning of being is a 
question of the access to being and beings, of access to meaning (Sinn). Thinking 
ability as access is an ethical thinking.
I have suggested “access” as a name for the mediational supports necessary 
for a being to be what it is. To be supported is simultaneously to be pressured, to 
be oriented towards certain possibilities and not others, to have access to this and 
not to that. Ability as access simultaneously affords and singularizes the projects 
and praxis of a life. The pitcher is only able to be a pitcher if we are claimed by it 
in and through its abilities, which both require and offer support, which assume 
certain conditions and ability expectations for it, for ourselves, and for all that 
is. The mediational support of a given ability determines a range of possibilities 
and cannot be understood outside of other constitutive structures of the being 
in question. To speak of the “corporeal variability” of a being is to speak about 
its abilities as avenues of access; it is to speak of the abilities of a thing in rela-
tionship to its beginning(s) and ending(s), to its natality and mortality. Neither 
Heidegger, Embodiment, and Disability
natality, nor mortality can be understood without corporeal variability, for it is 
the third term which makes sense (Sinn, sens) of each.
4. Heidegger, Nazism, and Eugenics
Even if, at this point, one is convinced by this reading of the problematic of em-
bodiment in Heidegger and finds the concept of access helpful, the idea of reading 
Heidegger through a philosophy of disability/disability studies lens should give 
one pause. To read Heidegger is already to be committed to many things. It is to 
engage with one of the more influential thinkers of the twentieth century. It is, if 
taken seriously, to deeply engage with the German language, much of German 
culture, and with the history of philosophy as prominent German intellectuals 
drew it up in the nineteenth century, for better or for worse.
It is further to ask the questions Heidegger asked, reflect upon the answers 
he proposed, and enter into the program—and it is a program—of philosophi-
cal inquiry he laid out on the heels of Aristotle, Scotus, Husserl, and others. 
But, and herein lies the rub, it is also to read and take seriously the single most 
famous human at the ignominious intersection of philosophy and Nazism. The 
Third Reich not only failed to think the meaning of disability, as did Heidegger, 
but they treated people with disabilities as the easy case of plans for elimination 
through genocidal slaughter. That is to say, among the very first that the National 
Socialist Party went after were those with disabilities. Set up in 1939, Aktion T4 
(an abbreviation for Tiergartenstraße 4) was the model for the larger genocide 
of many millions that would follow.
By engaging in this study and by thinking Heidegger alongside questions 
of embodiment and disability, I hope to have used Heidegger’s own work to 
undermine the bulwarks in his thinking that leave no room for people with dis-
abilities, that fail to see the profound import of the vast variability and import 
of concrete human bodies and minds, and that undermine projects that seek a 
more equitable world.33 Heidegger’s influence on continental philosophy cannot 
simply be written out of the tradition, and it is an ongoing task to find ways to 
read that can open us up better, more just, and more equitable futures.
Notes
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e.g., GA 65: 74/93 and 108–09/137–38. A different way to put this, to follow Daniela 
Vallega-Neu, is that only a poietic approach to beings and, a fortiori, beyng is that 
which will allow the truth of beyng to essentially occur. A poietic thinking would 
not adhere to the triune universal-particular-singular (scholastic) distinction, nor 
to variations on it. See her “Poietic Saying” in Charles E. Scott et al., Companion to 
Heidegger’s Contributions to Philosophy, Studies in Continental Thought (Bloom-
ington: Indiana University Press, 2001). It is only through a certain reticence, an 
unanticipated preparation that the letting of the essencing or essential occurring of 
the thing can itself west.
20. Andrew Mitchell notes, speaking of the Beiträge, that a “rethinking of the body and 
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30. Andrew Mitchell, The Fourfold: Reading the Late Heidegger (Evanston, IL: North-
western University Press, 2015). As an example: “to be finite is to exist beyond 
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This notion of ‘medium,’ which I endeavor to unfold in what follows, is endemic to 
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is the world. Simply put, to think the finitude of things is to think the mediacy of 
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33. An anonymous reviewer wondered why I do not engage the vast literature in disability 
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out such an engagement based upon it in future studies.
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by Petra Jaeger. 1994. Translated by Andrew J. Mitchell as Bremen and Freiburg 
Lectures: Insight Into That Which Is and Basic Principles of Thinking. Bloomington: 
Indiana University Press, 2012.
Heidegger, Martin. Gesamtausgabe, Volume 89 Zollikoner Seminare. Edited by Peter 
Trawny. 2017. Parts of which are translated by Franz Mayr and Richard Askay as 
Zollikon Seminars: Protocols, Conversations, Letters. Edited by Medard Boss. Evan-
ston, Ill.: Northwestern University Press, 2001.
Homer. The Iliad. Translated by A. T. Murray. The Loeb Classical Library. 2 vols. London; 
New York: W. Heinemann; G. P. Putnam’s Sons, 1924. 
https://doi.org/10.4159/DLCL.homer-iliad.1924
Joel Michael Reynolds
Homer. The Iliad of Homer. Translated by Richmond Lattimore. Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press, 1962.
Irigaray, Luce. The Forgetting of Air in Martin Heidegger. Constructs Series. 1st ed. Austin: 
University of Texas Press, 1999.
Krell, David Farrell. Ecstasy, Catastrophe: Heidegger’s Being and Time and the Black 
Notebooks. SUNY Series in Contemporary Continental Philosophy. Albany: State 
University of New York Press, 2015.
McNeill, William. “A Wave in the Stream of Chaos: Life Beyond the Body in Heidegger’s 
Nietzsche.” Philosophy Today 50, (2006): 156–61.
https://doi.org/10.5840/philtoday200650Supplement18
Mitchell, Andrew J. The Fourfold: Reading the Later Heidegger. Evanston, IL: Northwestern 
University Press, 2015. https://doi.org/10.2307/j.ctv43vtf4
Nancy, Jean-Luc. Corpus. Paris: Éditions Métailié, 2006.
Nancy, Jean-Luc. Corpus. Translated by Richard A. Rand. New York: Fordham University 
Press, 2008.
Plato. Complete Works. Indianapolis, Ind.: Hackett Pub., 1997.
Raffoul, François. The Bloomsbury Companion to Heidegger. Bloomsbury Companions. 
London; New York: Bloomsbury, 2013.
Schalow, Frank. The Incarnality of Being: The Earth, Animals, and the Body in Heidegger’s 
Thought. Albany: Albany: State University of New York Press, 2006.
Schürmann, Reiner. Broken Hegemonies. Translated by Reginald Lilly. Studies in Conti-
nental Thought. Bloomington, Ind.: Indiana University Press, 2003.
Scott, Charles E., Susan M. Schoenbohm, Daniela Vallega-Neu, and Alejandro Vallega. 
Companion to Heidegger’s Contributions to Philosophy. Studies in Continental 
Thought. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2001.
Thesaurus Linguae Graecae. Irvine, Cal.: University of California, Irvine, 2014.
Toombs, S. Kay. The Meaning of Illness: A Phenomenological Account of the Different 
Perspectives of Physician and Patient. Philosophy and Medicine. Boston: Kluwer 
Academic Publishers, 1992. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-011-2630-4
Vargas, Valentina Bulo. “The Bodies against Heidegger.” Pensamiento 67, no. 252 (2011): 
265–78.
Young, Iris Marion. Throwing Like a Girl and Other Essays in Feminist Philosophy and 
Social Theory. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1990.
Heidegger, Embodiment, and Disability
